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ABSTRACT 
 
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have become a widely used measure for 
security systems. The main problem for those systems results is the irrelevant alerts on 
those results.  
We will propose a data mining based method for classification to distinguish serious 
alerts and irrelevant one with a performance of 99.9 % which is better in comparison with 
the other recent data mining methods that have reached the performance of 97%. A 
ranked alerts list also created according to alert’s importance to minimize human 
interventions. 
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                                          1. INTRODUCTION 
An IDS sensor can generate thousands of alerts in a day [1, 2]. Often vast majority of the 
alerts are false positives or of low importance [3,1]. More than 90% of those alerts being 
irrelevant [4, 5, 6] so an IDS alert log’s analysis techniques are often used to distinguish 
the important IDS alerts from irrelevant events. Our result showed that the performance 
has been enhanced as we reduced the number of irrelevant alerts to 99.9 % in comparable 
with the performance of other recent techniques that reduced the number of irrelevant 
alerts by 74-97% only [4, 2, 7, 8, 1]. 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
Data mining techniques first used for knowledge discovery from telecommunication 
event logs more than a decade ago [9]. Clifton and Gengo [10] have investigated the 
 International Journal of Electronic Commerce Studies 2 
 
detection of frequent alert sequences and enhanced by Ferenc [11], Walter A. Kosters and 
Wim Pijls [12] this knowledge for creating IDS alert filters. Long et al [3] suggested a 
snort clustering algorithm. During the last 10 years, data mining based methods have also 
been proposed in many research papers [4, 5, 10, 3, 7, 8]. 
  
 
                                      3. Mining Frequent Patterns  
Mining frequent itemsets from a database has been solved largely by algorithms that are 
Apriori based and those that are pattern-tree growth techniques. Algorithms for mining of 
all existing techniques do not include generating frequent patterns for each transaction as 
needed for many applications. 
Table 1: Example Alerts/items Data set Records 
Alerts Item 
Alert1 1 3 4 
Alert2 2 3 5 
Alert3 1 2 3 5 
Assume a data set which contains alert records generated by an IDS system in Table 1 
where the set of items I = {1, 2, 3, 16, 20} and the set of Alerts = {Alert1, Alert2, 
Alert3}.Mining all alerts that have similar frequent itemset at minimum support of 50% 
would require generating frequent itemsets with the alerts in the format [< itemset > 
Alert-list].  
We proposed the AlertFp algorithm for mining frequent patterns with the Alerts where 
they occurred. Mining Fps with Alerts on an IDS log is an important goal of this 
algorithm where we are linking all frequent patterns to the alert transactions where they 
came from. Then count the number of frequent patter founded on each transaction. 
Finally all transactions in the dataset re-sorted according to the number of the related 
frequent patters. AlertFp algorithm represents each frequent k-pattern as form < Fk1, 
Alert1k1, Alert2k1, . . . , Alertmk1>, where Fk1is the first frequent k-pattern, and 
Alertmk1 is the mth Alert of the first frequent k-pattern. Thus, with this AlertFp 
technique the data set is scanned to obtain the candidate 1-itemsets with a list of their 
Alerts. The Alerts of each candidate pattern is implemented. Then, the count of each 
candidate pattern’s Alerts is equivalent to the support of the pattern.  After applying the 
frequent pattern mining algorithm to past IDS alert logs (AlertFp) to discover patterns 
that describe redundant alerts. Alert weight is measured by calculating Frequent Pattern 
Outlier Factor (FPOF) for each alert’s transaction. 
 
FPOP (t) =  
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The interpretation of the above formula follows [19]. If a transaction t contains more 
frequent patterns, its FPOF value will be big, which indicates that it is unlikely to be an 
outlier. 
In contrast, transactions with small FPOF values are likely to be outliers or to be 
considered as an interesting alert to be investigated by the security analyst. 
By using x s and re-order the IDS alerts by the simple FPOF 
for simplicity we will have the important alerts on the top of IDS log and irrelevant alerts 
will be pushed to the end of the log file. 
 
Algorithm 1. (Alert:Computing Frequent Patterns with Alerts) 
Algorithm AlertFp() 
Input: A list of k-items, Alert Set of k-Alerts, mini-support s. 
Output: A list of frequent patterns Fps and the relative Alert.  
Begin 
1. Scan the Data Set once to compute 
2. Compute frequent pattern F1 from candidate k-itemsets 
C1 as F1 = {list of k itemset with Alertslist count ≥ minsupport , Alert1counter}. 
3. For Fi < k   i=1 m=0 Counter=0 do 
Begin 
3.1. If Fi € Alertmi then counter(m)++ 
3.2. i = i+1, m=m+1 
3.3. Compute the next candidate set Ci+1 as F1  
End 
 
4. CASE STUDY 
Snort [22] used in IDS sensor package that applies attack signatures for detecting 
suspicious network traffic and can emit alerts as syslog. Consider the below Snort sample 
(figure 1). This sample will be used to simply clarify the idea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Snort alerts sample 
The frequent patterns discovered from the sample IDS log as shown in figure 2. 
7 1 508 WEB-MISC/doc/access  25 2 6/11/2010 8:57 AM 1136881320 2148203530 6 46,865 
80 
7 2 508 WEB-MISC/robots.txt/access 25 2 6/11/2010 8:57 AM 3632363311 2148203629 6 
34,074 80 
7 3 508 WEB-MISC/robots.txt/access 25 2 8/11/2010 8:59 AM 3632363313 2148203229 6 
34,075 80 
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Figure 2. Sample alert patterns 
Finally the alerts are sorted in ascending order according to their simple FPOF and top 
p% of them is put into the set of candidate true alerts. The alerts are sorted in ascending 
order according to their weight (FPOF) as shown in figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Figure 3. Output sample 
5. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE 
In this section, we describe our classifier implementation and experiments. In our setup, 
alerts sorted in a new separate log file for further review. Classifiers are rebuilt every 
midnight using the IDS sensor log data. Once the frequent pattern has been detected, it 
will be used for further alert classification. This allows for the classifier to adapt to new 
routine alert patterns with a reasonable learning time. The Outlier Factor will be 
calculated for each transaction, and then we will re-sort the transactions accordingly. In 
our experiments we have applied 5 artificial hacks from a specific source IP to be 
monitored on our result. Table 2 presents our experiment results on 22 June 2010 sample 
(with 28,670 records)  
 
Table 2: Experimental results 
mini-support frequent itemsets  attempted 5 attacks place reduction  
2 101101522 first 7 records 99.975 % 
4 32589268 first 24 records 99.916 % 
6 23664252 first 34 records 99.882 % 
* * * * *, t1, t2 ,t3         Support: 3 
 * * * * 25, t1, t2 ,t3         Support: 3  
7 * * * (25) , t1, t2 ,t3        Support: 3 
(7) * * * (25) 2, t1, t2 ,t3       Support: 3 
(7) * 508 * (25) (2), t1, t2 ,t3       Support: 3 
(7) * (508) * (25) (2) * * * * 6, t1, t2 ,t3     Support: 3 
(7) * (508) * (25) (2) * * * * (6) * 80, t1, t2 ,t3    Support: 3 
(7) * (508) WEB-MISC/robots.txt/access (25) (2) * * * * (6) * (80), t1, t2 Support: 2 
(7) * (508) * (25) (2) * 8:57AM * * (6) * (80), t1, t2   Support: 2 
(7) * (508) * (25) (2) 6/11/2010 (8:57AM) * * (6) * (80) , t1, t2  Support: 2 
 
 
simple FPOF t(3) = 7 ------------ 7 3 508 WEB-MISC/robots.txt/access 25 2 
8/11/2010 8:59AM 3632363313 2148203229 6 34,075 80 
simple FPOF t(1) = 8 ------------ 7 1 508 WEB-MISC/doc/access 25 2 6/11/2010 
8:57AM 1136881320 2148203530 6 46,865 80  
simple FPOF t(2) = 9 ------------- 7 2 508 WEB-MISC/robots.txt/access 25 2 
6/11/2010 8:57AM 3632363311 2148203629 6 34,074 80 
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During the experiments, we measured the system reliability and accuracy (figure 4) for 
different support values comparable with the original attempted attacks and its place in 
the output file 
 
.
Figure4. mini support value vs. the 5 attacks in output 
 
 
7. OPEN ISSUES AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have presented a novel data mining based IDS alert classification 
method sorted for the security analysts according to the alert importance. Although our 
preliminary results are promising, one issue remains open – major changes in the arrival 
rate of routine alerts might be symptoms of large scale attacks, but are hard to detect. 
However, this is an inherent weakness of alert classification and sorting systems (e.g., see 
[6, 20, 13] for a related discussion). For the future work, we plan to research our 
classification method further, and study various statistical algorithms (e.g., time series 
analysis) for detecting unexpected fluctuations in the arrival rates of routine alerts. 
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